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CHAPTER 18 
Workmen's Compensation 
LARRY ALAN BEAR 
A. COURT DECISIONS 
§18.1. "Arising out of" - "Scope of the employment." Bator's 
Case,1 decided during the 1959 SURVEY year, finally sounded the death 
knell for the restrictive common law "scope of the employment" con-
cept in Massachusetts. "Scope of the employment" is a phrase well 
known to the common law, and, narrowly interpreted, it refers solely 
to the inherent nature of the employment. On the other hand, the 
term "arising out of" the employment, used in almost all workmen's 
compensation statutes today, is not confined to the mere nature of the 
employment. It is, as stated by Lord Shaw over forty years ago, a 
broad new expression that "applies to the employment as such - to 
its nature, its conditions, its obligations, and its incidents." 2 
Perhaps the finest expression in American law of the important dif-
ference between the two terms is that put forth several years ago by 
Mr. Justice Frankfurter: 
As we read its opinion the Court of Appeals entertained the view 
that this standard precluded an award for injuries incurred in an 
attempt to rescue persons not known to be in the employer's serv-
ice undertaken in forbidden waters outside the employer's prem-
ises. We think this is too restrictive an interpretation of the Act. 
Workmen's Compensation is not confined by common-law concep-
tions of scope of employment. . .. The test of recovery is not 
a causal relation between the nature of employment of the injured 
person and the accident ... nor is it necessary that the employee 
be engaged at the time of the injury in activity of benefit to his 
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§18.1. 1338 Mass. 104, 153 N.E.2d 765 (1958). 
2 Thomas v. Sinclair, [1917] A.C. 127, 142. 
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employer. All that is required is that the obligations or conditions 
of employment create the zone of special danger out of which the 
injury arose.3 
The long history of th~ confusingly intertwined "arising out of - scope 
of the employment" doctrines in Massachusetts, culminating in the 
Bator decision, provides an interesting study in the art of legal disen-
gagement. Actually, itpoints up very clearly the fact that even today 
workmen's compensation is having trouble separating itself from "the 
old, barnacle-encrusted legal concepts" 4 of the common law that it 
was statutorily created to avoid. 
On November 4, 1919, a cloth-dyeing-machine operator named 
George Koza was bothered, while working, by water dripping on him 
fttlffi it ventilator pipe above his head. He had in the past complained 
abotlt this to his foreman, since the pipe was the property of the em-
ployer, and he had been promised that it would be taken care of for 
him. 'Nevertheless, the ventilator pipe continued to drip well and 
ventilate poorly. Koza, then, on the day in question, left his machine 
and started to go up on the roof of the building to see if he could fix 
the 'Ventilator which rose above the roof nearest his machine. While 
on the roof for this purpose he fell, receiving serious, permanent in-
juries for which he sought compensation. 
The Industrial Accident Board held that Koza's "act and purpose 
which moved him were so intimately connected with his employment 
conditions that the resulting injury [was] within the scope of his em-
ploymentrelation and ... ar[ose] out of such employment." II How-
ever, the Supreme Judicial Court held that it was no part of the em-
pI9y'ee'~ oc<;upation to repair the ventilator, that he engaged in an un-
dertaking that was not within the scope of his employment and could 
not be, found to arise out of it.6 The Court held, then, that whether the 
empl,oyee was within the scope of his employment was not a question 
of fact put a matter of law, and further that the new statutory phrase 
"ari~ing out of" was limited in concept by the restrictive old common-
law phrase"'scope of the employment." 
$\m~lar later cases met a similar fate,7 and it was not until Demetre's 
Ca.s~ ,that ,th,e Court took a step out of the dense undergrowth of com-
mon-law restrictions. In that case, Demetre, who was a filling carrier 
employed by a cloth manufacturer, was injured while assisting a fellow 
e,J;l}plo,yee~ a weaver, to untaIlgle a belt on her weaving machine. The 
, . i O:L~~I:y v. Brown·Pacific·Maxon, Inc., 340 U.S. 504, 506, 7I Sup. Ct. 470, 471, 
91> ;L .. :!!d. 4~3, 486 (1951) . 
. ,4 Dea,r, ,Survey of the Legal Profession - Workmen's Compensation and the Law-
yer, 51 Colum. L. Rev. 965, 969 (1951). 
, II Ko;ta:s Case, 236 Mass. 342,344·345, 128 N.E. 400 (1920) . 
. 6236 Mass. at 345, 128 N.E. at 400. 
7 See,' e.g., Roberts' Case, 284 Mass. 316, 187 N.E. 556 (1933), holding that when 
an employee goes outside the scope of his employment and incurs a danger "of his 
own choosing" he cannot recover. 
S 322 Mass. 95,76 N.E.2d 140 (1947) . 
. ---.------~----~----~------- ---
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Board found that the employee, Demetre, did not incur a risk beyond 
the reasonable scope of his employment.9 
The Supreme Judicial Court felt that the employee's attempt tore-
store the machine to a state of usefulness and the means he used to 
do so were not so unreasonable and so unrelated to the service he was 
employed for (merely to distribute filling in baskets to the weavers) 
that it could be said as a matter of law that the injury did not arise out 
of and in the course of the employment.1o In support of its decision, 
the Court stated that the employee was not performing an act he had 
been forbidden to do,11 a statement that was as true for the KoZa and 
succeeding cases as in this one. 
The Court stated that they felt the Koza line of cases were not "con-
trolling." It is difficult to know whether the Court regarded the main 
issue here one of fact or one of law, but it is clear that they chose to 
expand the "scope of employment-arising out of" concept by hazy de-
cision rather than clear-cut definition. . 
Such is the background of Bator's Case.12 In this case the employee, 
who had been employed by his company for thirty years, was injured 
on his lunch hour. It was the custom of the employees, during lurich 
hour, to sit and rest or lie down in some of the large boxes or hand 
trucks that were in the preparing room where they worked. This was 
a custom known to the employer and not prohibited. The employee 
in this case was already in one of these boxes during the lunch houi, 
but since it contained jute he felt too hot in it and stepped to another 
box also containing jute. From there he attempted to get into a thi~<i 
box, and in the attempt fell, sustaining injury. 
The single member of the Industrial Accident Board found the em~ 
ployee had voluntarily incurred a risk not contemplated by his employ~ 
ment, and found against him.13 The review board, whose deCision 
supersedes that of the single member and is controlling,14 reversed, but 
the Superior Court issued a decree dismissing the employee's claim.lli 
The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, and ordered a decree entered 
for the employee. Its decision is important for two reasons: (l).it 
clearly held, for the first time, that whether an employee is in the scope 
of his employment in any given instance is a question of fact for. the 
board to determine;16 (2) it clearly held that the term "scope of the 
employment" can. only be used "as [it] is understood for compensatio~l 
11 322 Mass. at 97, 76 N .E.2d at 141. 
10 322 Mass. at 99, 76 N .E.2d at 142. 
11 Ibid. 
12338 Mass. 1M, 153 N.E.2d 765 (1958). 
18338 Mass. at 104, 153 N.E.2d at 766. 
14 DePietro's Case, 284 Mass. 381, 385, 187 N.E. 773, 774 (1933). 
Iii It should be stated here th~t negligence on the part of the employee has. never 
been a bar to compensation recovery. Only the "serious and wilful misconduet". 
of the employee can bar him under the provisions of G.L., c. 152, §27. and no find-
ing of serious and willful ,misconduct was ever made in any of the· "scope of the 
employment" cases discussed in this section. . . 
16338 Mass. 104, 106. 153 N.E.2d 766.767 (1958). 
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purposes," 17 and further, that it is to be understood for compensation 
purposes to have the same meaning as "arising out of" the employ-
ment,18 which meaning is: "[an injury] aris[ing] out of the nature, 
conditions, obligations or incidents of the employment; in other words, 
out of the employment looked at in any of its aspects." 19 To the ex-
tent that there was "anything to the contrary" in Koza and other like 
cases, the Court stated: "We are not disposed to follow them." Thus 
has the Court finally shaken off the last of the restrictive common-law 
trappings in this area. 
The Court is certainly to be congratulated for its decision in Bator, 
since it goes far toward putting the entire law of workmen's compensa-
tion in its proper perspective. But the confusion resulting from the 
use of both of the terms "scope of the employment" and "arising out 
or' could be eliminated by adopting the line of reasoning that "scope 
of the employment" as a term of art has no place in the compensation 
law.20 The only test of compensability, in this area, should be whether 
the injury "arose out of" the employment, in the broadest sense of 
that term as defined by the Court in Bator's Case. 
§18.2. Evidence: Burden of proof. One of the most important 
workmen's compensation cases of first impression to come before the 
Supreme Judicial Court in some time was, unfortunately, avoided by 
the Court through a rescript without opinion. As in all instances in 
which the Court exercises its unchallengeable prerogative to, in effect, 
deny certiorari to the appealing party, the cause for complaint on the 
part of the bar is not: Why did not this side or the other prevail? but 
rather: Why were not the central issues faced and examined thor-
oughly, and a decisioQ. made on the substantive merits? 
Pinto's Case1 holds the dubious distinction of being the only work-
men's compensation rescript without opinion in the history of the 
Court to have been certified in the Superior Court as raising a sub-
stantial question of law within the meaning of G.L., c. 152, §ll, and 
then to have been held by the Supreme Judicial Court for four and 
a half months subsequent to argument before being decided.2 Both of 
these facts, incidentally, fail to appear anywhere in the rescript without 
opinion, a fate also suffered by most of the actual facts in the record 
of the case. 
Sadi Pinto had been employed for two years by a meat packing con-
cern. His job was to work one or two hours per evening in a hot smoke-
house where meats were being cured. While inside he would sweat 
profusely. Immediately upon leaving the smokehouse he would change 
17 558 Mus. at 106, 155 N.E.2d at 767. 
181bid. 
1. Ibid. 
20 The term "scope of the employment" is nowhere to be found in C.L., c. 152. 
See especially id. §26. 
§18.2. 11959 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1167, 159 N.E.2d 529. A member of the author's 
law firm represented Pinto in this case. 
2 Ibid. 
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his shirt, which was wet with sweat, in a locker room and then go to 
work in the company freezing room where his job was to hose down 
with cold water the frozen meats therein, preparatory to removing 
them from the cold room. He worked in this room three or four houn 
per night.s Except for a hernia operation in 1948 the employee testi-
fied he "was never sick up until August 1953." At work on August 1, 
1953, he had the chills, was shivering, shaking and felt cold. He re-
mained at work in this condition until August 11, when he consulted 
a doctor. Even after seeing the doctor, he continued to work until 
August 14, 1953. However, X-rays were taken on August 17 which 
showed tuberculosis, and on September 5 he was admitted to the Bos-
ton Sanitorium for tuberculars with acute active tuberculosis.4 
The employer had knowledge of the employee's tubercular condition 
on September 3, two days prior to his admission to the hospital. The 
employee remained hospitalized in the sanitorium for forty-one con-
secutive weeks, and filed his claim for compensation three months after 
leaving the sanitorium. He remained under medical attention after 
leaving the sanitorium, and was, in fact, under medical care at the time 
of his hearing. At the time of his hearing his employer was still in 
business, and there were co-employees of Pinto's who were still at work 
for the employer. 
At the hearing, a qualified tuberculosis specialist testified on Pinto's 
behalf that he examined the X-rays of the employee taken three days 
after he left work, that he further examined the Boston Sanitorium rec-
ords, and that he himself examined and X-rayed the employee. He 
testified that there was tuberculosis in the employee's lungs which was 
caused to break down and become aggravated by his work, that he had 
activity going on that broke down and reached the point that was 
reached finally in August of 1953. He testified: "This is not conjec-
tural or speculative; this is a thing that must have been going on." He 
further testified that Pinto's working conditions "were responsible for 
lowering his body resistance and lowered the resistance of his lungs to 
that respiratory infection, lowering his resistance to tuberculosis; the 
lowering of his resistance and the breakdown of tuberculosis was due 
to working conditions." II On cross-examination the doctor was asked: 
"Then it is true doctor, that if we assume that he had the dormant 
tubercular infection that it could have been lighted up or aggravated 
by his work." He answered: "Yes." On re-direct, he reiterated his 
original position as being that which he had testified to on direct ex-
amination.6 
The insurer offered no evidence whatsoever. It presented no wit-
8 Report of Member of the Industrial Accident Board. Sadi Pinto's Case, CUe No. 
12175, Supreme Judicial Court. February Sitting. 1959, Record, pp. 2·4, 12. 
4Id .• p.4. 
II Id .• pp. 8-9 (emphasis supplied). It is also important to note that the record 
shows that the tuberculosis expert had actually gone into the hot smokeroom him-
self and knew the conditions there first-hand. 
6 Id .• p. II. 
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nesses and. did not attempt on cross-examination to' cast doubt on any 
portion of the employee's testimony, or that of his medical expert, ex-
cept to point out that the employee felt he was in good health up to 
August, 1953, and that the doctor did not know when the original tu-
berculosis germs were contracted . 
. The employee's claim was aggravation and precipitation' into an 
acute condition of a latent, dormant and quiescent tuberculosis. This 
has been a compensible condition in the Commonwealth, even in tort 
C!lses, for almost half a century.7 
The single member, in his decision, made only one finding of fact: 
that the employee had been in good health up to 1953 with the excep-
tion of a hernia condition in 1948. After making this single finding, 
he went on to state: "After careful consideration of all the evidence, I 
find that the employee has failed to sustain the burden of proof that 
the pulmonary tuberculosis from which he suffered was caused or ag-' 
gravated by his employment," 8 and dismissed the employee's claim.' 
On 'review, the case was remanded for the purpose of making findings 
on the issue of claim and notice. The single member found that the 
employer had no notice of an industrial injury, that claim was not 
filed for a year and that the insurer was prejudiced. Again, there were 
no subsidiary findings. The review board affirmed and the Superior 
Court issued a decree dismissing the employee's claim; however, it cer-
tified to the Supreme Judicial Court that the claimant's appeal raised 
a substantial question of law within the meaning of G.L., c. 152, §11.9 
In its Pinto decision, the Court stated that there was evidence that' 
the employee was in good health until August 1, 1953. It did not state 
tha~ this was lay evidence only, and that therefore no medical conclu-
sions of any kind could be drawn from this evidence with regard to 
Pinto's tubercular condition that would not be reversible error.10 The 
Court further stated, as though it were important, that the expert who 
testified for the employee had examined him a full year after his break-
down.· It neglected to point out that his opinion was rendered with 
the assistance of original X-rays taken three days following the break-
down, and a substantial hospital record as weIl. l1 
The Court further stated that the expert testified that "assuming" 
the employee had had tuberculosis, there "could" have been a lessening 
of his general health because of working conditions that caused his 
tubercular breakdown.12 It neglected to point out that the word 
"c0~ld'! was used by insurance counsel in his question on cross-exami-
nation, and that both before and after that question the doctor testi-
or Larson v. Boston Elevated Railway Co., 212 Mass. 262, 267, 98 N.E. 1048,1050 
(1!1:1~). ,. 
8 Record, p. 12. 
9 Superior Court, No. 70939 Eq., Record, p. 21. 
10·LeBlanc's Case, 334 Mass. 265, 267, 134 N.E.2d 900, 901 (1956); Josi's Case, 324 
Mass. 415, 417,418, 86 N.E.2d 641, 643 (1949). 
111959 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1167, 159 N.E.2d 329. 
12 Ibid. 
-----~--------'--.-
-------_.---- ----_. __ .. _--- --~-------.-------
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fied positively that there was 'a medical causal relationship betweeri the 
work~ng conditions' and the tubercular breakdown. It also neglected 
to point out that the medical expert "assumed"nothing, but stated as 
a positive fact on the basis of the X-rays taken three days after the 
breakdown that latent tubercular germs had existed. IS Most' impor-
tant, it neglected to point out that the insurer submitted no evidence 
on its own behalf to rebut the employee's prima facie case. " 
In support of its holding, the Court cited only one case, S~henais 
Case,14 another rescript without opinion. This case is hardly in poi itt 
since it involved an unusual situation in which the employee da~med 
he originally contracted pulmonary tuberculosis at work, but 'pre,-
sen ted no lay or medical evidence to establish that there were any tu-
bercular germs at the place of work, and, further, presented no mediCal 
evidence whatsoever to establish a probable causal relationship 'be-
,tween his work and his sickness.15 " , 
The important point with regard to the Pinto decision is not at all 
that if the Court had fairly set forth the facts 'in the case they would 
have been bound to find for the employee, but rather that if theyha:d 
fairly set forth the facts in the case they would have been forced tp fac;:e 
the important issues it raised, and to have resolved them in one way or 
another. ' , " 
One of the central issues the Court avoided in Pinto was whether 
the ultimate findings of the board were consistent with the subsidiary 
findings, or, stated in another way, whether there were sufficient sub-
sidiary findings in law upon which to base the general finding;16 The 
Court has clearly held that when the evidence submitted by the' eni-
ployee is of such a character as to give rise to a reasonable inference Cone 
trary to the finding of the single member, then there must be suffi,dent 
subsidiary findings for the Court to examine in connection with th~ 
ultimate finding to determine the propriety of the latter, or the ulti-
mate finding must, as a matter of law, fail as being too generaI,l7: ' 
An equally important issue, however, is whether, when all the fads 
in the record were produced by the employee and clearly establisheCl 
a prima facie case" and when all of this evidence was uncontradicted, 
unimpeached, not inherently incredible and not on its face open to. 
reasonable contrary inferences, it was erroneous as a matter of law':fdi-
the board to enter a finding against the employee. ,,' ,: " " 
The argument for the insurer is a strong one. It is a herculea:n "task 
indeed, in law, to prove a negative. Yet, let it be assumed in the pres" 
ent case that the insurer had presented medical evidence through: a 
general practitioner licensed to practice medicine for only one month': 
Let it be further assumed that he testified, although he had never seen 
18 Cf. Williams' Case, 333 Mass, 271, 273, 130 N.E.2d 562, 563 (1955), uto 'testi: 
mony wrested from it' context so as to disturb its meaning. ' 
14 329 Mass. 767,109 N.E.2d 174 (1952). 
15 Record, Schena's Case, 329 Mass. Papers and Briefs, Part 13; pp. 13-15(1952). 
16 Roney's Case, 316 Mass. 732, 734, 56 N.E.2d 859, 863 (1944). ' 
17 Craddock's Case, 310 Mass. 116,:125-126,37 N.E.2d 508, 513(1941). 
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a tuberculosis case, and although he felt the employee's expert testi-
mony must be accorded great weight, that he nevertheless felt it to be 
possible that no work relationship existed. No one would seriously 
doubt that a decision against the employee based upon this evidence 
could not stand. The insurer should hardly be placed in a better posi-
tion for having submitted no evidence whatsoever. 
Furthermore, although it is a truism in our compensation law that 
there is no appeal from findings of the board based upon questions of 
fact when there is any evidence to support them, it is likewise a truism 
that evidence to support them there must bellS It also cannot be de-
nied that credibility is for the trier of fact, but credibility cannot be, 
for the trier of fact, a carte blanche for action unsupportable on the 
record. 
Let us assume a compensation case involving heart injury in which 
the only medical witness to testify is Dr. Paul Dudley White for the 
employee. Let us assume that he testified, without equivocation, that 
the employee's working conditions were responsible for his heart at-
tack. If, under these circumstances, the board dismissed the employee's 
claim upon the ground that he failed to sustain the burden of proving 
that his injury was related to his work,l9 we would begin to wonder 
whether the credibility doctrine, rather than being held in high esteem 
as the wastebasket into which all sorts of incomprehensible decisions 
on the facts can be thrown and thus justified, ought not to be thrown 
into a wastebasket all of its own. And it should be clear that no valid 
distinction can be made, in a court of law, between Dr. White, as an 
expert in his field, and say, Dr. Smith, diplomate of the American 
Medical Association Board of Psychiatry and Neurology, in his. 
Certainly, in the realm of credibility, the trier of facts should be en· 
titled reasonably to exercise his prerogative to believe or disbelieve. 
Whenever there is conflicting evidence in any given case he must do 
this. When no evidence for disbelief is apparent on the face of the 
record, the trier of fact in compensation cases should not supply it 
without providing a thorough explanation therefor in his decision.2o 
A good case can be made, based upon a respectable body of estab· 
lished case law, for the proposition that the Industrial Accident Board 
is not warranted in disregarding uncontradicted, unimpeached testi· 
mony of a workmen's compensation claimant when it contains no in-
herent contradictions or improbabilities, and is not rendered doubtful 
by any other matters in evidence, and that a finding against the com-
pensation claimant in such circumstances is error and reversible, as a 
matter of law.2l Certainly, the Supreme Judicial Court has always held 
11 R.oney's Case, !l16 Mass. 7!12, 7!14-7!15, 56 N.E.2d 859, 863 (1944); jameson's Case, 
254 Mass. !l7I, 372-373, 150 N.E. 151 (1926). 
1~ We are assuming here that, as was the case in Pinto, there was no factual dis· 
pute about the existence of the working conditions as described by the employee. 
20 Cf. Chase v. General Electric Co., 83 R..I. 269, 115 A.2d 683 (1955). 
21 Stiltner v. Industrial Commission, 77 Ariz. 69, 72, 267 P.2d 234, 235-236 (1954); 
Haller v. Northern Pump Co., 214 Minn. 404, 406, 8 N.W.2d 464, 465 (1943); Web· 
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that just as there must be evidence to support a finding for the claim-
ant there must be evidence in the record to support a finding against 
him,22 and the Court could further hold that when such evidence does 
not exist the finding against the employee should be reversed.23 
These were the issues presented on the record, in the briefs, and in 
oral argument in Pinto's Case. The issue is not that the employee here 
was wronged in that his claim for compensation was denied, but rather 
that the employee, the insurer and the bar in general were, through an 
evasive rescript without opinion, denied their right to have these se-
rious legal issues, now still undecided, resolved for the future. 
B. LEGISLATION 
§18.3. Liens on workmen's compensation. Section 5 of G.L., c. 
117, was amended by allowing a lien on the expected recovery of an 
employee from workmen's compensation.1 If the employee obtains re-
lief or support from a town as a result of an injury covered under the 
workmen's compensation act, the board of welfare of the town may re-
quire an assignment of the expected recovery. This would operate as 
a lien only to the extent of relief and support provided. 
§18.4. Preference in re-employment. General Laws, c. 149, was 
amended by Acts of 1958, c. 593, to give preference to an injured 
worker, who has received workmen's compensation under Chapter 152, 
in re-employment by the employer for whom he worked at the time 
of his injury.1 This preference is over other persons not previously 
employed by the employer, but the available employment must be suit-
able for the mental and physical well-being of the worker and within 
his qualifications. 
Although the amendment uses the words "shall have preference," 
the sanctions for fulfilling the mandate of the statute are not apparent. 
Moreover, an injured person might have difficulty showing that he 
comes within the broad qualifications set forth in the new section. 
The objective of this amendment is most desirable but the amendment 
might well be strengthened to guarantee its meeting its objective. 
ster Construction Co. v. Bates, 227 Miss. 207, 216, 85 So.2d 795, 798 (1957); Cain v. 
Robinson Lumber Co., 365 Mo. 1238, 1243, 273 S.W.2d 741, 744 (1955); Pietz v. 
Industrial Accident Board, 127 Mont. 316, 320-321, 264 P.2d 709, 711 (1953); Gaffey 
v. John J. Felin Co., 162 Pa. Super. 222, 57 A.2d 432 (1948); Valente v. Bourne Mills, 
77 R.I. 274, 277-278, 75 A.2d 191, 193 (1950). 
22 Burgess' Case, 331 Mass. 90, 92, 117 N.E.2d 148, 149 (1954); Crichlow's Case, 329 
Mass. 762, 106 N.E.2d 417 (1952) (compare with Schena's Case, 329 Mass. 767, 108 
N.E.2d 926 (1952»; Nouse's Case, 326 Mass. 797, 92 N.E.2d 877 (1951); Wiencis' Case, 
319 Mass. 553, 556, 66 N.E.2d 715, 717 (1946); Roney's Case, 316 Mass. 732, 734-735, 
56 N.E.2d 859, 861-862 (1944). 
23 Villapando v. Industrial Commission, 70 Ariz. 55,58-59,216 P.2d 397, 400 (1950); 
Gagnon's Case, 144 Me. 131, 133, 65 A.2d 6, 8 (1949); Plucinski v. Rores Luncheon-
ette, 277 App. Div. 803, 96 N.Y.S.2d 773 (2d Dept. 1950). 
§18.3. 1 Acts of 1959, c. 395. 
§IM. 1 G.L., c. 149, §51B. 
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§18.5. The exclusion of certain homeowners as employers. Gen-
eral Laws, c. 152, §1(5), was amended to exclude as an employer, within 
the meaning of the statute, the owner of a dwelling house having not 
more than three apartments and who resides therein, or the occupant 
of a dwelling house of another who employs persons to do maintenance, 
construction or repair work on such dwelling house or on the grounds 
or buildings appurtenant thereto.1 
§18.6. Specific compensation: Benefits structure.1 General Laws, 
c. 152, §36(d), was amended by Acts of 1959, c. 230, to include cover-
age for a period of two hundred weeks for non-correctible eye injury 
which produces an inability to use both eyes together for single binoc-
ular vision. 
Acts of 1959, c. 545, amends several other paragraphs of Section 36 
to do away with an existing inequality. Heretofore, the loss of sight of 
both eyes carried an extra specific compensation benefit over and above 
double the singular loss of each eye.2 No such provision for additional 
coverage for loss of both arms, hands, legs, or feet was allowed until 
this amendment. Under this new amendment the following benefits 
are awarded: For the loss of both legs by severance at the hip, a pe-
riod of four hundred weeks;8 for the loss of both feet at or above the 
ankle three hundred and twenty-five weeks;4 for the loss of both hands 
three hundred weeks;5 for the loss of both arms, four hundred weeks.6 
The period for bilateral loss of hearing has been increased from two 
hundred to three hundred weeks.7 
The last paragraph of Section 36 has also been amended to strengthen 
that portion calling for payment of specific compensation to employees 
in one bulk sum.8 
§18.7. Employee in non-insured employment injured outside the 
Commonwealth. General Laws, c. 152, §66 eliminated certain defenses 
in actions for personal injuries sustained by employees in the course 
of their employment. The purpose of this section was to place an em-
ployee of a non-subscribing employer under the workmen's compensa-
tion act as nearly as possible in the same position as an employee of an 
employer who was a subscriber.1 It has not been clear whether Section 
66 applied to personal injuries received by non-insured employees in 
the course of employment outside the Commonwealth, although it has 
always been true that employees in insured employment are entitled to 
the benefits of Chapter 152 for injuries sustained outside the Common-
518.5. 1 Acts of 1958. c. 429. 
§18.6. 1 See 1954 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law 522.2. 
2 G.L .• c. 152. §§86(a). (b). 
ald. §86(n). 
4 Id. §86(o). 
ald. §86(s). 
8 Id. §86(t). 
7 Id. §86(f). 
8 Acts of 1959. c. 199. 
S1S.7. 1 Zarba v. Lane. 822 Mass. 182. 76 N.E.2d 818 (1948). 
--------------------------------------------
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wealth.2 Section 66 has now been amended to extend specifically its 
coverage to all personal injuries sustained by an employee in non-cov-
ered employment outside the Commonwealth.s 
§18.8. Dependency benefits. General Laws, c. 152, §31 has been 
amended for the second time within four years1 to increase the rates 
to the unmarried widow or widower of the employee from $25 a week 
to $30 a week.2 The rates for both widow or widower and a child of 
the employee are increased from $30 a week to $35 a week. Upon the 
remarriage of the widow or widower, the children of the employee are 
to receive $10 a week in lieu of other payments, instead of the prior 
$7 a week. The equal payments provision to all children of the em-
ployee, if there is no surviving spouse, has been increased so that the 
limit anyone individual may receive is $35 a week instead of $30 a 
week. The total amount of allowable payments has been increased 
from $10,000 to $14,000. 
§18.9. Extension of coverage to regional school districts. Chapter 
152, §69 of the General Laws was amended by Chapter 55 of the Acts 
of 1959 to extend optional coverage under the workmen's compensa-
tion act to workmen and mechanics employed by a regional school dis-
trict. A vote of its regional district school committee is necessary to 
exercise this option. 
§18.10. Weekly benefits structure.1 Sections 34,2 34A,a and 354 
of G.L., c. 152, were amended twice within the 1959 SURVEY year by 
Acts of 1958, c. 665, and Acts of 1959, c. 566. 
Under the provisions of Chapter 665 of the Acts of 1958, effective 
January 15, 1959, temporary total disability benefits, permanent and 
total disability benefits and partial disability benefits were all raised 
to $40 per week. The maximum benefits allowable under the tem-
porary total disability section remained at $10,000, while the partial 
disability benefits section was raised to $12,000. However, the amend-
ment further provided for maximum payments of $12,000 when tem-
porary total and partial benefits were paid for the same injury. 
Under the provisions of Chapter 566 of the Acts of 1959, effective 
December 7, 1959, temporary total, permanent and total, and partial 
disability benefits have all been raised to $45 a week. The maximum 
benefits allowable under the temporary total section have been raised 
to $14,000, and, in connection with the partial benefits section, have 
been raised to $15,000. The amendment further provides for maxi-
mum payments of $15,000 when temporary total and partial benefits 
are paid for the same injury. 
2 C.L., c. 152, §26. 
a Acts of 1959, c. 478. 
§18.8. 1 See 1956 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §19.8. 
2 Acts of 1959, c. 530. 
§18.10. 1 See 1957 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §30.7; 1956 Ann. Surv. Masi. Law §19.10. 
2 Temporary total disability benefits section. 
S Permanent and total disability benefits section. 
4 Partial disability benefits section. 
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In addition, the weekly dependency provision of G.L., c. 152, §35A, 
has been raised from $4 to $6 per week by Chapter 566. 
§18.11. Costs and counsel fees. The costs section of the workmen's 
compensation act1 has been amended through the addition of a new 
Section 12A.2 This new section, applicable in all discontinuance of 
compensation proceedings3 in which the insurer is ordered to continue 
payments, makes mandatory the award of an amount sufficient to com-
pensate the employee for the reasonable costs of the proceeding, in-
cluding reasonable counsel fees. 
§18.ll. 1 G.L., c. 152, §12. 
2 Added by Acts of 1959, c. 585. 
8 G.L., c. 152, §29. 
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